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Abstract 18 
The cost of personalised medicine in oncology is increasing. The varied and contrasting priorities of 19 
the pharmaceutical industry, local and national governments, international medical community, and 20 
patients need to be reviewed and balanced. In addition to the economic and political standpoints on 21 
this issue, the ethical considerations from physicians' viewpoints need to be considered to optimise 22 
cancer patients' care. In this paper we discuss the way research and development of these drugs is 23 
carried out and reimbursed, and how this needs to change. We describe frameworks assessing the 24 
value of these treatments which been developed. Physicians need to develop their knowledge and 25 
understanding of these issues, to best meet their dual responsibilities of advocating for their 26 
patients and promoting public health. 27 
 28 
The Cost of Cancer 29 
Cancer is expensive. Worldwide, the financial cost to an individual has been shown to be 30 
significant. In the UK where healthcare is free at the point of delivery, a Macmillan charity 31 
report found the cost of a cancer diagnosis resulted in being ~£570 a month pooreri. A 32 
diagnosis of cancer in the US increases the chance of bankruptcy by 250% [1]. In addition to 33 
expense to the patient, cancer is expensive at every level of local and national health 34 
systems, and increasingly so. The changing face of oncology with the development of 35 
personalised medicine and associated meaningful improvements in survival and treatment 36 
toxicity [2], has the potential to revolutionise care, but comes at a price. This price relates to 37 
not only the drug itself but the care process with a crucial role of molecular characterisation 38 
of tumours, which may need to be rebiopsied and/or sequenced at relapse. Even with rapid 39 
development, potential benefit is only for a minority; a recent study identified the 40 
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proportion of US patients estimated to benefit from genome-targeted therapy in 2006 to be 41 
0.7%, in 2018 this had increased to just 4.9% [3]. However there is the potential for 42 
personalised cancer medicine to minimise cost, for example a gene expression assay has 43 
recently been shown to predict chemotherapy benefit and identify patients with breast 44 
cancer at low risk of recurrence who can be spared chemotherapyii. The concept of ‘value’ is 45 
important, and numerous frameworks have been developed to assess the value of new 46 
drugs. These can include for example efficacy, toxicity, and quality of life. Value-based 47 
pricing describes the pricing of a drug based on assessment of its benefits and risks.  48 
The price of drugs 49 
In 2000 the average cost of one year of a new systemic anti-cancer therapy (SACT) was less 50 
than US$10,000. In 2016 a new medicine for a similar indication could cost in excess of 51 
US$100,000 for same duration of treatment. The US Agency for Health Care Research and 52 
Quality reported a total spend of $88.7 Billion in 2011iii and the European Union reported 53 
spending €126 Billion in 2009 [4]. The cost of developing a new drug has been estimated at 54 
$2.6 Billion in 2014iv], representing a remarkable almost three-fold increase in the cost of 55 
developing new drugs. However, the price of new cancer drugs has increased ten-fold over 56 
approximately the same period, with little evidence that improvements in patient outcomes 57 
have kept pace. While these costs are not exclusively due to the use of personalised 58 
medicine in oncology, as traditional treatment chemotherapy and radiotherapy still play a 59 
significant role, they are responsible for the brunt of it. In addition to the cost of the drug 60 
itself, there are also the costs of companion diagnostics, development costs, and relevant 61 
associated technology. 62 
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At the same time as the costs of cancer care are spiralling ever upwards, the growth in total 63 
healthcare expenditure in developed countries has continued to outstrip the rate of 64 
economic growth, and public sector funding of healthcare is up to 46% of total public 65 
expenditure in some countriesv.  Against this background, the economics of healthcare 66 
provision in oncology is no longer an esoteric question of interest to a niche community of 67 
academics. To sustain high quality cancer care it is vital to understand the cost drivers in the 68 
current management of cancer and identify where the choices we make for the future of 69 
cancer care improve value for money.  70 
So why are these anti-cancer drugs so expensive? One argument to justify this is that these 71 
therapies have demonstrated an improvement in quality and extension of life. Viewed in 72 
terms of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), the mean incremental health gain from 73 
specialty drugs (personalised therapies defined by the authors as ‘large molecule’ drugs 74 
produced using advanced biotechnology requiring special administration, monitoring and 75 
handling) launched between 1999 and 2011 has been valued at 0.25 QALYs compared with 76 
0.08 for traditional drugs [5]. Twenty two of these 58 drugs were for cancer. Another factor 77 
is that targeted therapies, almost by definition, are suitable for fewer patients than previous 78 
systemic therapies. This therefore means the commercial return on R&D investment must 79 
be achieved from fewer sales, resulting in upward momentum to prices.  80 
Another consideration is the move from small molecule drugs to biotherapies such as 81 
monoclonal antibodies. The methods of manufacture for biotherapies are considerably 82 
more complex and hence expensive than for conventional therapies, and this is necessarily 83 
reflected in their prices.  However, Rader and Langar [6] report that the efficiency of the 84 
production of biopharmaceuticals improved hugely between 2001 and 2014; the yield 85 
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increasing from 1 to 2.56 gram/litre. This suggests that the cost of manufacturing should 86 
lower drug prices during this period. It has not. The complexity of manufacture also creates 87 
a non-IP (Intellectual Property) barrier to market entry, which means that the end of the 88 
patent’s life does not automatically equate to generic entry and monopoly prices can 89 
continue for longer than the patent period. The complexity of manufacture for biologic products, 90 
is accepted to be orders of magnitude more complex than conventional small molecule therapies. 91 
There is real concern that apparently identical production processes will not produce equivalent 92 
products, and this has led to regulators to create new regulatory pathways for biosimilar products – 93 
the equivalent of generics for biologic products – included the requirement of clinical trial evidence 94 
to support a claim of therapeutic equivalence. These regulatory requirements mean that much 95 
larger upfront investments are required to compete with biologic products after patent expiry. All 96 
other things equal, this makes biosimilars a less attractive investment opportunity than generics for 97 
small molecule therapies.  It also reduces the pool of companies who have the financial and 98 
technical resources required to launch a competitor product. 99 
An alternative explanation that has gained increasing credence in the media is that the 100 
rising price of drugs reflects what the market will bear, rather than value or costs of R&D.  101 
During the early 2000s treatments for rare diseases – referred to as Orphan Drugs – were 102 
launched with prices in excess of $100,000/patient/yearvi. Whilst this was protested, it was 103 
paid. In the context of a market, the decision to pay these extremely high prices was a signal 104 
to drug manufacturers that the willingness to pay for health gains was considerably higher 105 
than had previously been assumed. As drug manufacturers are commercial organisations 106 
with a legal duty to maximise shareholder value, and hence profits, it was entirely 107 
predictable that the prices for new drugs would increase in response to the information 108 
implicit in the decision to pay premium prices for orphan drugs.  109 
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Decisions on allocation of resources 110 
Clearly governments have a driving role in allocation of resources. The use of health 111 
technology assessment (HTA) to guide these decisions is well-established in the majority of 112 
developed countries and is becoming increasingly prevalent in developing countries. The 113 
belated realisation by government bodies that manufacturers will seek to maximise the 114 
profit from their therapies has led to a range of novel policy responses with heightened 115 
political significance.  The issue of drug prices, including the price of cancer drugs was an 116 
issue in the 2016 US Presidential electionvii-ix, and continues to be a key issue for the Trump 117 
Presidencyx. A number of State Governments have developed ‘Transparency Bills’ that force 118 
drug manufacturers to disclose how much they spent on R&D of new drugs, to inform 119 
judgements about what prices would represent a ‘fair return’ on that investment [7].  120 
Clinicians have also become increasingly publicly concerned about the cost of new cancer 121 
drugs. In 2012 three physicians at the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Hospital took a 122 
public stand, refusing to prescribe Zaltrap, the vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) 123 
inhibitor also known as aflibercept, for their patients because it ‘has proved to be no better 124 
than a similar medicine we already have….while its price – at $11,063’ is twice as high”xi. 125 
One of these physicians, Peter Bach, subsequently led the development of the ‘Drug 126 
Abacus’xii, which explicitly assesses the value of cancer drugs. The National Comprehensive 127 
Cancer Network incorporated affordability into its ‘Evidence Blocks’ Clinical Guidelinesxiii. In 128 
October 2015 a group of patients and clinicians called on the UK Government to over-ride 129 
Roche’s patent on its Breast Cancer drug Kadcyla, because the £90,000, was considered too 130 
highxiv.  131 
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In the UK, the individual cost and total budget impact of new cancer drugs became so acute 132 
that in 2010 a dedicated Cancer Drug Fund (CDF)xv was established. This allowed 133 
consideration of funding for drugs not currently appraised or recommended by the National 134 
Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE). In 2015, having exceeded its allocated budget, its 135 
remit changed, with a view to generate evidence for promising but still unproven new 136 
cancer therapies whilst ensuring that the total budget impact did not destabilise the UK 137 
health system’s general pharmaceutical budget.  Currently the CDF considers drugs that 138 
have been assessed by NICE to have the potential to be cost-effective and approval is based 139 
on the premise of further data collection to reduce uncertainty on cost-effectiveness 140 
estimates and to further price negotiations between the manufacturer and Department of 141 
Health. Whilst it had many problems, with one analysis finding that the CDF had not 142 
delivered meaningful value and may have exposed patients to toxic side effectsxvi this 143 
mechanism was designed to link the price of new cancer drugs to their effectiveness. It also 144 
addressed concerns that too rigid an application to value-based market access will eliminate 145 
potentially valuable therapies from the health systems formulary before they have had 146 
chance to prove their value. The original version of the CDF was designed to be a stop-gap 147 
measure, whilst a programme of Value Based Pricing was developed to replace the long 148 
established UK Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS) (see Text Box 1).  149 
So who should make decisions on how these resources should be allocated and how should 150 
they do it? What role and responsibility should the individual physician bear? As clinicians 151 
we are used to being our patients’ advocate, and lobbying for patients under our care on an 152 
individual basis to be able to access drugs through commercial access schemes, 153 
compassionate use programmes and clinical trials. The decisions we make with patients 154 
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regarding treatment options are also frequently emotionally charged, and the emotional 155 
and ethical considerations of treatment choices in relation to expensive personalised drugs 156 
need to be considered.  157 
Ethical considerations 158 
Medical students are taught about the four pillars of ethics described by Beauchamp and 159 
Childress: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice [8]. The right of a patient to 160 
choose or refuse their treatment, or autonomy, could be interpreted as all patients having 161 
the right to access personalised SACT if appropriate and indicated. Simply put, if they want a 162 
treatment that has evidence of efficacy they should be able to have it. Realistically this is 163 
limited by local access and funding. Beneficence dictates we should act in the patient’s best 164 
interests. In the context of resource allocation this can be difficult to bring into accordance 165 
with non-maleficence, or primum non nocere: first, do no harm. We have to consider to 166 
whom we have a duty of care: individual patients, all patients under our care, all patients 167 
nationwide or even globally. If we act in a single patient’s best interest and allocate 168 
resources to an individual, other patients whose care is funded by the same budget may not 169 
be able to access treatment and therefore have been harmed. By following the principle of 170 
beneficence for one patient we may inadvertently go against the principle of non-171 
maleficence for another, or potentially many. The opportunity cost needs to be considered. 172 
The fourth principle of justice balances some of these concerns, with the premise of 173 
ensuring fair and equal treatment for all. To consider the treatment of other hypothetical 174 
patients as a clinician when one patient is in the clinic room in front of you is difficult. 175 
Perhaps one mentality physicians adopt is to advocate their individual patient’s treatment 176 
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with the assumption that other patients will be equally advocated by their physicians, and 177 
that it will all ‘balance out’. However there is significant geographical variation in access to 178 
SACT through the CDF in the UKxiii, and on a global scale we know that access to 179 
personalised medicine is extremely limited in low and middle income countries and this 180 
further worsens the health divide between these economies [9].  181 
The question of how to ethically allocate a personalised SACT drug is relevant at a patient’s 182 
first consultation with a physician, deciding local funding policy; orchestrating governmental 183 
policy; development of national and international guidelines; and the influence of the 184 
pharmaceutical industry and media. It is unrealistic and unfair to expect clinicians or 185 
economists at the present time to be able to precisely predict all the consequences of 186 
proposed treatments or policies at population level, given the complex nature and influence 187 
of these events. In the future methodological systems may exist to facilitate this to allow 188 
clinicians more control over balancing ethical and financial decisions. Generally clinicians 189 
will follow local or national guidelines which include drugs that can be funded locally, and 190 
therefore it is vital that these are made with cost-effectiveness, efficiency and ethics in 191 
mind.  192 
In addition to the ethical issues regarding allocation of treatments there are also ethical 193 
issues regarding the diagnostic side of personalised oncology. Patients may, through routine 194 
practice, clinical trials or self-funded through direct to consumer (DTC) genetic testing, be 195 
tested for genetic or biological markers which do not link directly to treatment decisions or 196 
options. Patients may develop inaccurate expectations of treatment based on these tests or 197 
be psychologically distressed if they feel they have an aspect of their diagnosis they are 198 
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powerless to ‘treat’, the issues raised around these tests can also have profound effects on 199 
family relationships10.  200 
Having access to international guidelines which do not take financial constraints into 201 
account such as American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) or European Society of 202 
Medical Oncology (ESMO) guidelines can give conflicting recommendations. Knowledge that 203 
there may be a superior treatment plan than one a patient can access locally provides 204 
physicians with an ethical dilemma, between complying with local guidelines which have 205 
included cost-effectiveness in their work up and may better comply with the principle of 206 
justice, and advocating treatment for the individual patient based on international 207 
guidelines which would represent the principle of beneficence. Value frameworks provided 208 
by ASCO and ESMO exist which attempt to take cost into account with potential benefit to 209 
quality of life, these may be helpful on an individual level but are less helpful for population-210 
level reimbursement decisions; their scoring systems also reflect implicit values about the 211 
relative importance of different domains which may not represent the individual’s priorities. 212 
Another complicating factor is that physicians are frequently involved in managing 213 
healthcare resources or writing regional, national or international guidelines.  214 
To be just, these guidelines need to be developed transparently with input from patients, 215 
clinicians, and the funding/provider parties. An example of this is NICExviii in the UK, which 216 
includes engagement with all relevant parties at every stage of the appraisal process for 217 
specific new strategies, and a formal citizens’ council which reviews the underlying moral 218 
and ethical principles behind reimbursement decisions.  219 
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The concept of acknowledging ethical considerations in HTA is not new and has been 220 
discussed since the conception of HTAs in the 1970s. However ethical issues have been 221 
shown to only be included in a minority of HTAs in numerous studies11-13. Hofmann in his 222 
review of the issue discusses reasons why ethics is so seldom included in HTA14. These 223 
include: poor inclusion of ethicists in HTA, no common agreed methodology for integrating 224 
ethics, ethics methodology appears to be deficient, insufficient, or unsuitable, integrating 225 
ethics in HTA is neither efficient nor needed for successful HTA, most moral issues are 226 
general and not specific to a given technology, all relevant ethical issues can be handled 227 
within other frameworks such as economics, and that ethics can undermine or burst the 228 
foundation of HTA14. The debate on if and how ethics could be formally included into HTA is 229 
complex; one viewpoint is that as healthcare itself is integrally ethical, ethics cannot be 230 
removed from its allocation, the only question is how to formalise this. Merging the 231 
practical, the moral and the philosophical is a difficult task. 232 
From a clinician’s personal viewpoint, as long as these local guidelines are developed by 233 
ethically accountable processes robust to judicial review, clinicians on an individual basis 234 
may be satisfied the interests of their patients are fairly advocated [15]. It could be argued 235 
that to be truly just and demonstrate accountability for reasonableness, patients who bear 236 
the opportunity cost should also be represented [16,17]. 237 
 238 
Concluding Remarks 239 
It is likely that the reimbursement environment for cancer drugs will become more 240 
challenging in the future. The push back from patients, clinicians, payers and governments 241 
12 
 
has begun. There are implications of the changing reimbursement environment for 242 
developers of future cancer therapies, including precision medicine. Achieving regulatory 243 
approval in major markets, principally the US and the European Union, has historically been 244 
the purpose of clinical translational research. The focus has therefore been on meeting the 245 
relevant regulatory requirements, for safety and efficacy. This has shaped the design of 246 
research and development (R&D) processes, disproportionally to the likely value of the new 247 
drug.  248 
This is likely to be increasingly common unless developers change how they think about 249 
developing their R&D processes. Approximately 90% of drugs entering phase 1 clinical trials 250 
fail, in oncology the probability of drugs in phase I trials to gain FDA approval has been 251 
calculated at 6.7% [18]. The addition of failure at the reimbursement phase of translation 252 
may make the development of further precision medicine drugs too risky for developers to 253 
invest. We need to rethink how we develop and test these drugs. Companies that have 254 
invested millions in drug development understandably need to see a return on their output 255 
or they will go out of business. But how much profit is ‘enough’? The focus on investment 256 
into R&D cannot only be on being reimbursed. The needs of the payers, as well as those of 257 
the licencing authorities and regulators need to be considered (Text Box 2). A measured and 258 
balanced approach to R&D development decisions is needed to weigh these multiple 259 
factors.  260 
Bubela and McCabe have proposed a structured framework evaluating candidate 261 
technologies from a value perspective, discussed further in the Outstanding Questions 262 
section [19]. Priority should be given to technologies for which there is substantial 263 
headroom for improvement in health. By avoiding developing technologies for which there 264 
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is neither substantial nor valued need, the limited financial resources available for 265 
translating precision medicine technologies, can be allocated more appropriately and have a 266 
greater impact on future cancer therapies. 267 
There is no easy solution to these dilemmas. See Outstanding Questions for a list of the 268 
main issues still to tackle. Health economics and its direct relevance to patient care must be 269 
included in medical education from an undergraduate level, and continued in postgraduate 270 
training. For clinicians to feel they have understanding of these issues this must be a subject 271 
discussed at medical conferences with representation by economists and discussion 272 
between clinicians, economists and those involved in developing guidelines and allocating 273 
resources.  274 
For guidelines to be developed ethically regarding the allocation of these resources the 275 
concept of accountability for reasonableness is useful, advising that guideline development 276 
and assessment for funding is undertaken by a group which includes patients who bear the 277 
opportunity cost. The process needs to be fully transparent with a process for appeal. The 278 
use of technology widely available such as videoconferencing and/or streaming these 279 
discussions live may facilitate this.  280 
A structured framework which evaluates candidate technologies from a value perspective 281 
can help avoid developing technologies for which there is neither substantial nor valued 282 
need. Priority should be given to technologies for which there is substantial headroom for 283 
improvement in health – i.e. conditions where the health lost by each affected individual, 284 
compared to a full quality adjusted life expectancy, is substantial.  Also, conditions 285 
associated with expensive costs to health care systems offer an opportunity for technologies 286 
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that achieve the same or better outcomes at a lower price. In assessing the headroom for a 287 
new technology it is important to examine forecasts of which technologies might be on the 288 
market at future time points. Careful analysis of clinical trial and patent databases can be 289 
used to identify technologies that are ahead in the translational pipeline. This can provide 290 
insight into the true headroom for a technology at the start of the translational process. 291 
In these complex issues which involve global and local economics, politics, and the media 292 
we must retain focus on the core issue – how can we get the right drugs to the right 293 
patients? With a joint development of these frameworks we may be able to get a cohesive 294 
solution to an expensive problem. In addition to politicians, pharmaceutical industry 295 
investors, economists and journalists, physicians have to represent their interests – the 296 
patient – in these discussions. How else will we be able to look our patients in the eye and 297 
say, “I have the right drug for you”?  298 
 299 
 300 
 301 
Value Based Pricing 302 
 303 
The fundamental idea behind Value Based Pricing is that the price paid for a new drug (or 304 
indeed any health care intervention) should reflect the value that it produces. If a health 305 
care payer can be explicit about what is valued and how much it is willing to pay for a given 306 
amount of that value, then for any given technology, an assessment of the value produced 307 
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will lead directly to the price that will be paid. For example, consider a new drug that 308 
produces an additional two years of good health compared to current treatment. If we 309 
measure years in good health as QALYs and the health care payer is willing to pay up to 310 
£30,000 per QALY, then the maximum price for the new drug would be 2 x £30,000 = 311 
£60,000 [27]. In reality Value Based Pricing is much more complicated as the value of health 312 
gain tends to be affected by other factors such as the age/stage of life of the recipient, the 313 
severity of the health problem and even the characteristics of the technology itself [28]. 314 
When the UK government attempted to develop a Value Based Pricing framework, based 315 
upon consultations with the UK population, they were unable to identify a framework that 316 
was acceptable to all stakeholders in the negotiations [29]. As a result, the plans were 317 
scrapped and new 5 year PPRS agreement was implemented in its stead. 318 
Value Based Pricing is only one of many alternative market access proposals that have been 319 
proposed by both policy makers and academics over the last two decades.  Whilst these 320 
schemes have many different names, they can be considered in three categories: Pay for 321 
Performance (P4P) which link the price that a manufacturer receives to the observed value 322 
of technology in practice, Only with Research (OWR) which make the therapy available for 323 
all patients with an agreed clinical indication(s), as long as a pre-defined research study is 324 
underway (although the patient in question does not need to be enrolled) and Only in 325 
Research (OIR) which makes a therapy available for patients enrolled in a pre-defined 326 
research study that is designed to address a weakness in the existing evidence base.   327 
363 328 
 329 
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Regulator vs payer approach to evidence 330 
Regulators’ and payers’ approach to evidence differ in two important ways. The first is that 331 
payers are interested in effectiveness rather than efficacy; i.e. how well does a technology 332 
work in the real world rather than how well does it work in ideal circumstances. The second 333 
is that payers are interested in actual health benefits when they consider effectiveness, 334 
rather than biological surrogates of health such as tumour shrinkage or progression free 335 
survival. The use of surrogates by regulators is one of the major sources of uncertainty in 336 
the evidence base for effectiveness and value. For payers, uncertainty has a cost, which can 337 
be measured. The value of the health gain is frequently characterised as the payer’s 338 
willingness to pay for health. If the expected value of making the wrong decision is 339 
sufficiently large, payers may choose to require more research either as part of the 340 
implementation of the technology into the health system (OWR), or withhold 341 
reimbursement until more research is undertaken (OIR). If the payers require further 342 
research, the time for all patients who could benefit from the therapy to access it may be 343 
extended. 344 
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